Seeking asylum: the case of former Chinese operative, Li Fengzhi

The tipping point came when Li returned to the People’s Republic of China for a visit, and was interrogated by the country’s Ministry of State Security (MSS). He was interrogated, because Li was no ordinary student studying abroad.

His case stems back to the Bush Administration. This is when Li Fengzhi first sought asylum from the People’s Republic of China in 2003, after being sent to the United States to study for a PhD in international politics and diplomatic philosophy at Denver University. Once experiencing life in the US, Li wanted to stay – hence he wanted to defect from the communist dictatorship he called home. The tipping point came when Li returned to the People’s Republic of China for a visit, and was interrogated by the country’s Ministry of State Security (MSS). He was interrogated, because Li was no ordinary student studying abroad.

When he returned to Denver, after a brief visit to his homeland, Li Fengzhi applied for asylum. His initial application for asylum was denied and that is when, two years later, Li revealed to US authorities that he was a former operative in the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of State Security; thereby admitting to US intelligence that he was in fact a spy.

It was a risky move for Li Fengzhi indeed. His revelation ran the risk of branding him a traitor in his homeland and possibly, if he were not believed by US intelligence, he would be labeled here as a liar. Having felt there was little choice Li, reluctantly, reached out to the FBI and the CIA for help. Li’s case then consequently languished as undecided by both agencies. It seemed neither the FBI nor the CIA knew what to make about the defector’s claims, or at least, neither agency had cared to comment about it. Li’s state of limbo appeared to be coming to an unfortunate end when the Obama Administration came into power, and they sought to deport him back to the People’s Republic of China.

The idea of deporting Mr. Li, shocked and befuddled some; like Michelle Van Cleave, chief of National Intelligence Executive, which is the policy setting arm of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Van Cleave expressed her perplexity to the Washington Post in 2010 when she said, “I can’t understand why the Obama Administration would oppose Li’s application for asylum.” She knew Li Fengzhi faced almost certain imprisonment, even execution for treason should he wind up back in the People’s Republic of China. After all, those like Wang Baodong, spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington D.C. consider dissidents like Li to be traitors to the Chinese government and the communist ideal.

Because, not only did Li Fengzhi reveal he was an operative with the MSS, but he also exposed the ministry’s true purpose. For decades, the communist regime claimed the function of the MSS was simply to secure the safety of the nation and its people. However, Li’s revelations told a different story altogether. In an interview with the Washington Times’ Bill Gertz in 2009 Li stated, “MSS is actually not doing things for the security of the country, but rather they spend a lot of effort to control the people, the dissident, the lower-class Chinese people, and make these people suffer and also make their life miserable.”

In essence, Li confirmed what many in the US intelligence community already suspected, which was that the MSS was fashioned in a similar manner as the former Soviet Union’s KGB, which maintained a dual purpose of conducting espionage overseas, while suppressing its own people at home. Li also highlighted how the MSS’ military counterpart, the Second Department of the People’s Liberation Army (2PLA) infiltrates foreign countries to steal technology for use in Chinese military weapons systems.

For a country like China, that goes to great lengths to suppress its own people, as well as any information regarding its clandestine activities, Li Fengzhi instantly became a dangerous man to the communist regime. And if the reaction to the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 are any indication of how the People’s Republic of China treats dissention, what Li had revealed, not only made him a dangerous man, but it made him a marked one as well.

In Li’s own words, his defection from his homeland and leaving his former position with the MSS, was his own brand of protest. It was an act of clear defiance, as he exclaimed in his interview with the Washington Times that he, “hated doing things just for the interest of the Communist Party,” which included, among other things, the suppression of non-official Christian churches and Falun Gong, a Buddhist group who has advocated for the removal of communist rule in China.

Though it might stand to reason that even if a fraction of what Li Fengzhi had exposed about China’s secret initiatives were true, this would make him a tremendous asset to US intelligence officials. However, there are some that believe the FBI and CIA felt Li “oversold” himself, or that US intelligence became disheartened when Li “rejected the idea of working as a mole,” as suggested by the Washington Post’s Jeff Stein in September of 2010, which may have contributed to decision to deport him.

Whether Li’s actual claims that he was a former MSS operative or the types of espionage activities the ministry was engaged in were true, there are some who have intimate knowledge of how Chinese intelligence operates that might support, at least in part, what Li had asserted. One example, is how Li expressed that the MSS has several thousand trained operatives who work around the globe trying to infiltrate foreign societies and governments to steal technology and undermine their democratic processes, which include those of the United States. Li said operatives will regularly pose as diplomats, journalists, business representatives, and even collegiate professors. Former FBI Special Agent I.C. Smith, a specialist in Chinese intelligence practices agrees, “they [MSS] use not just intelligence people but academics.” China has certainly taken Li’s revelations seriously since presently he is considered by the communist regime to be an enemy of the state.

Li had also commented recently to China’Watch’Canada in July of 2014 regarding a case involving flirtatious exchanges between a Canadian Conservative MP, Bob Dechert, and chief Toronto correspondent for Xinhua, Shi Rong. Xinhua is a large Chinese state-controlled media organization established in the 1930s. Since he had been removed from the MSS for some time, Li could not confirm whether Shi Rong was acting as an operative with the ministry, while posing as a foreign journalist, but he warned to, “pay attention to this.” Li stated in the article that it is not uncommon for MSS operatives to target Western politicians for purposes of policy influence, or to speak on China’s behalf.

There are those that have argued that Li only decided to “reveal” his status as a former intelligence operative after his asylum application was denied, and as part of some desperate attempt to use such possible status as a bargaining chip to secure his stay in the United States. Either end of the argument regarding Li’s status is difficult to establish, since the Chinese government will not acknowledge that the MSS engages in foreign espionage or domestic suppression, and neither the FBI or the CIA will fully reveal what Li Fengzhi had told them, nor how much of which was said had been confirmed. In either case, the Li Fengzhi case should be considered, if nothing else, a constant reminder that there are, and there continues to be foreign, nefarious elements in the world, that seek to undermine the national security interests of the United States, Western democracy, and quite possibly freedom itself.