Iran’s influence in Afghanistan

Because Herat City, Afghanistan’s third largest metropolitan area, and Islam Qala are in such close proximity to Iran, this makes the western province a prime target for the Taliban to re-establish a foothold.

Iran sits along the western border of Afghanistan, with Islam [Kafir] Qala as an official port of entry into Herat Province. This has long been a major point of trade between the two countries. Because Herat City, Afghanistan’s third largest metropolitan area, and Islam Qala are in such close proximity to Iran, this makes the western province a prime target for the Taliban to re-establish a foothold. In turn, this also allows Iran, a long supporter of the Islamic fundamentalist group, to assist the Taliban in both their efforts to fund and engage in terrorist activities in an effort to destabilize the Western-backed government in Kabul.

What also makes Herat such a key location for both Taliban and Iranian interests, comes as a result of massive troop reductions by the Obama administration in 2014 essentially leaving many in Herat to wonder how the meagerly-numbered and trained Afghan National Army (ANA) will defend against Taliban incursion. The last seven to eight years there have seen a massive influx of Taliban and Al Qaeda-linked attacks upon U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces. President Trump has already expressed an interest in possibly increasing troop levels in Afghanistan, but as of yet neither the number, nor how many, or if any, will return to Herat.

One thing is certain, Iran’s IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard – Qods Force) is opportunistic, and they will stop at nothing to advance the Islamic Republic’s political and military aims inside of Afghanistan. The illicit and terrorist-supporting activities of the IRGC inside of Afghanistan has been well-documented by both U.S. military and intelligence officials. The Ansar Corps division of the IRGC has not wavered from its support of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and these terrorist groups have had little reservation in confessing to being the recipients of Iranian support.

In some cases, like in that of Sayyed Kamal Musavi, arrests have been made for their activities and connections to the IRGC. The unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas like Herat, have left behind a power vacuum and virtually laid a welcome mat for Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, trained and funded by Iran, to move rather freely back and forth across the border. General Samiullah Qatrah, the Chief of Police in Herat, has made clear he feels Iran is behind the support of the Taliban, and that IRGC officials and the Taliban travel across the border virtually unabated. Such activities parallel Iran’s gaining influencing and destabilizing activities in Iraq, both before and after the Obama administration’s withdrawal of U.S. forces that left behind a weak, ineffectual government in Baghdad. The IRGC has been tied logistically to several attacks by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Sayyed Musavi, an Afghan, was according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, “part of an attack cell targeting an Afghan official and was apprehended associates in 2010, who were at the time carrying large quantities of explosives and detonators.” The Treasury Department also notes that Musavi was “acting on behalf of the IRGC-QF as a facilitator and operational planner.” Bill Roggio of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies stated in an article in 2014 that “Iran’s support of the Taliban is well documented.” Also reported in the article, was Chief Samiullah Qatrah who was quoted as saying apprehended Taliban fighter admitted their “network is funded by Iran.” This came after a flurry of attacks in Herat Province, one of which led to the deaths of two female Finnish aid workers.

The Musavi case alone confirmed a long-suspected, close association between the IRGC and its willing proxies in the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In addition, two IRGC-QF officers, Akbar Seyed Alhosseini, IRGC chief in Herat and Alireza Hemmati who were cited as logistical supporters to Musavi. Alhosseini maintains a P.O. box in Taybad, Iran, a town that is roughly a thirty minute drive from Islam Qala. Also cited by the Treasury Department were two members of the IRGC’s Ansar Corps, Colonel Hasan Mortezavi and General Hossein Musavi for providing “funding and support to the Taliban.”

Iran’s interference and terrorism-funding activities in Afghanistan became so prevalent, former U.S. commanders, Generals David Patraeus and Stanley McChrystal publicly accused Iran of supporting the Taliban both financially and operationally. At the time, Generals Patraeus and McChrystal’s comments did not find a welcome ear in Washington, as the White House was preparing to enter into negotiations with Iran over its nuclear proliferation programs.

What was also becoming more evident, was the Islamic Republic’s attempts to destabilize the Western-backed government in Kabul. This was confirmed when Mahmed Alkhami, a high-ranking IRGC official was designated for action for attempting to gain, “influence over Afghan political affairs and for [his] efforts to advance Iranian interests with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” by trying to “curry favor with Afghan politicians.”  In addition, it is well-known by U.S. military and intelligence officials that Al Qaeda is operating out of Mashhad, Iran, a town only 200 miles from the Afghan border into Islam Qala.

What is adding more difficulties is how many in Afghanistan view the government in Kabul as corrupt, ineffective, and unable to provide the proper amount of security for its people. This lack of confidence grows amongst former warlords, tribal leaders, and religious figures who still wield a lot of influence amongst their local populaces. These individuals still seek to maintain power, but the Afghan people who see a rise in terrorism, drug trafficking, and violence and as a result, may be more willing to fall back on their local leadership, rather than trust those they cannot reach in Kabul. To ask a people who have never lived under any form of democratic governance to be patient, or understand the difficulties in establishing a functioning representative government is, at times, a very tough sell.

It becomes an even tougher sell when those inside the government, such as former President Ahmed Karzai’s first vice-president Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim, show doubt in the ANA’s ability to protect the people after the full withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces, and have expressed their fear openly of the Taliban’s return. Criticism of Kabul has also come from religious leaders like Mohammed Farooq Hussaini, western Afghanistan’s most prominent mullah. Former warlord and governor of Herat Ismail Khan had stated in an interview with International Policy Digest’s Fahim Masoud in 2015, that President Ashraf Ghani is “incapable of leadership,” and is “committing a huge betrayal against his country.”

Although Ismail Khan was never asked about Iran in the interview, he is clearly not a proponent of the Taliban. He himself was the target of a Taliban assassination attempt in 2009, and fought alongside the Northern Alliance and U.S. Special Forces in 2001. Yet Khan was also forced to flee Herat and was given asylum in Iran, along with 8000 of his followers when the Taliban came to power in 1997.

While Iran’s influence, funding, and training of terrorist groups in Afghanistan remain an “open” dirty secret, the unilateral troop withdrawals from entry points like Herat, and the Iran nuclear deal plagues any large-scale effort to put an end to Iran’s illicit activities. Moreover, the precipitous deterioration of confidence with the government in Kabul, makes the hearts and minds of Afghanistan’s populace, including its prominent and influential figures, fertile ground for IRGC-QF’s money, influence, and political coercion.